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Abstract. Imagine many small devices send data to a single receiver, encrypted
using the receiver’s public key. Assume an adversary that has the power to adap-
tively corrupt a subset of these devices. Given the information obtained from
these corruptions, do the ciphertexts from uncorrupted devices remain secure?
Recent results suggest that conventional security notions for encryption
schemes (like IND-CCA security) do not suffice in this setting. To fill this gap, the
notion of security against selective-opening attacks (SOA security) has been in-
troduced. It has been shown that lossy encryption implies SOA security against a
passive, i.e., only eavesdropping and corrupting, adversary (SO-CPA). However,
the known results on SOA security against an active adversary (SO-CCA) are
rather limited. Namely, while there exist feasibility results, the (time and space)
complexity of currently known SO-CCA secure schemes depends on the number
of devices in the setting above.
In this contribution, we devise a new solution to the selective opening prob-
lem that does not build on lossy encryption. Instead, we combine techniques
from non-committing encryption and hash proof systems with a new technique
(dubbed “cross-authentication codes”) to glue several ciphertext parts together.
The result is a rather practical SO-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme
that does not suffer from the efficiency drawbacks of known schemes. Since we
build upon hash proof systems, our scheme can be instantiated using standard
number-theoretic assumptions such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), deci-
sional composite residuosity (DCR), and quadratic residuosity (QR). Besides, we
construct a conceptually very simple and comparatively efficient SO-CPA secure
scheme from (slightly enhanced) trapdoor one-way permutations.
We stress that our schemes are completely independent of the number of chal-
lenge ciphertexts, and we do not make assumptions about the underlying mes-
sage distribution (beyond being efficiently samplable). In particular, we do not
assume efficient conditional re-samplability of the message distribution. Hence,
our schemes are secure in arbitrary settings, even if it is not known in advance
how many ciphertexts might be considered for corruptions.
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1 Introduction
The generally accepted notion of security for public-key encryption is indistinguisha-
bility of ciphertexts under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA, cf. [27, 30, 16]). For
IND-CCA security, it must not be possible to tell which one of two adversarially chosen
messages is encrypted, even when given access to a decryption oracle. The notion of
IND-CCA security has proved extremely useful. On the one hand, it essentially cap-
tures the notion of a secure channel against active attacks (see [9, 12]). On the other
hand, efficient IND-CCA secure encryption schemes can be constructed under standard
number-theoretic assumptions (e.g., [13, 26, 23]).
However, there are realistic scenarios in which IND-CCA security is not known to
provide security. For instance, consider a setting in which a large (and possibly a priori
unknown) number of small devices send data to a single receiver. Each device encrypts
its messages using the receiver’s public key. Now assume an adversary that has the
power to adaptively corrupt a subset of these devices. Say that, upon corrupting a de-
vice, the adversary learns the device’s complete internal state, including the random
coins used during previous encryptions. In that sense, the adversary may ask for se-
lective openings of ciphertexts. The obvious question is: do the unopened ciphertexts
remain secure? That is, can the adversary conclude anything about the plaintexts sent
by uncorrupted devices, beyond of course what is implied already by the revealed plain-
texts? While intuitively, the answer should be “no” for a secure public-key encryption
system, IND-CCA security does not seem to be immediately useful in this setting. (E.g.,
[21] shows that whenever encryption constitutes a commitment to the respective mes-
sage, the scheme cannot be proven secure using black-box techniques. This holds inde-
pendent of whether the scheme is IND-CCA secure or not.) We clarify that the problem
becomes moot if the senders can erase their randomness after sending the encrypted
messages (cf. [1]). However, reliable erasure is difficult on a real system. As such, we
will only focus on solutions that do not require erasures.
So far, only little is known on the construction of public key encryption schemes that
are secure under selective opening attacks (SOA secure) as discussed above. Concretely,
[3, 5] have shown that every lossy encryption scheme (cf. [29]) is SOA secure against
passive (i.e., eavesdropping) adversaries. This yields a generic construction of SOA
secure encryption that allows for fairly efficient instantiations. However, [3, 5] leave
open the question of designing schemes that are SOA secure against active adversaries.
Our contribution. We construct practical public key encryption schemes that are SO-
CCA secure, i.e., SOA secure against active attacks. Interestingly, we substantially de-
viate from previous techniques to obtain SOA security. To explain our approach, let us
briefly sketch how [3, 5] employ lossy encryption to achieve SOA security.
(Passive) SOA security from lossy encryption. Lossy encryption schemes have the
property that the scheme’s “real” public key can be substituted with a “lossy” public
key. Real and lossy keys are computationally indistinguishable, so – at least in a passive
security experiment – this change cannot be detected by an adversary. Now lossy keys
have the property that encryptions performed with them yield “lossy” ciphertexts that
are statistically independent of the plaintext. In particular, a given lossy ciphertext can
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be – in general inefficiently – explained (or, opened) as an encryption of an arbitrary
plaintext. Consequently, an SOA adversary cannot distinguish real keys, ciphertexts,
and openings from those implied by lossy keys. But in the lossy case, the adversary’s
view is statistically independent of unopened messages; SOA security follows.
SOA-CCA security from lossy encryption, and its limitations. Now consider an ac-
tive SOA adversary (i.e., one that is equipped with a decryption oracle). To prove SO-
CCA security, now additionally adversarial decryption queries have to be answered.
Obviously, this is impossible with fully lossy keys (i.e., keys that always encrypt to
ciphertexts that are independent of the plaintext). In the IND-CCA case (see [29]), the
solution to this dilemma is to make sure that only the challenge ciphertext is lossy. Tech-
nically, the security proof consider an “all-but-one” (ABO) public key. The ABO public
key only encrypts the challenge ciphertext into a lossy ciphertext, and the correspond-
ing ABO secret key can be used to decrypt any ciphertext except the lossy challenge
ciphertext (and thus can be used to answer decryption queries).
This technique works well in the IND-CCA case, since there we have only one chal-
lenge ciphertext. However, with SOA security, we have to deal with a – possibly huge
– vector of challenge ciphertexts that correspond to all openable ciphertexts. We would
need “all-but-many” public keys that allow to make only the challenge ciphertexts lossy.
(In fact, this is the exact approach taken by [20].) However, a counting argument shows
that now the public-key size is at least linear in the maximal number of challenge ci-
phertexts. In realistic examples as the one above, there might be thousands of openable
challenge ciphertexts. Hence, the lossy encryption approach leads to fairly impractical
schemes, which have huge keys, and which actually achieve only bounded SO-CCA se-
curity. The latter means that the number of challenge ciphertexts for which the scheme
is secure, is limited once the public key is chosen. If the number of potentially openable
ciphertexts happens to exceed this limit, nothing is guaranteed anymore.
Another limitation of this approach is that, unless a lossy ciphertext is efficiently
openable (a property which is not known to hold for most lossy encryption schemes),
the lossy encryption paradigm only achieves (bounded) so-called IND-SO-CCA secu-
rity. This in particular means that SOA security is only guaranteed for joint message
distributions that are efficiently conditionally re-samplable. This means that even when
conditioned on an arbitrary fixed subvector of messages, the remaining messages need
to be efficiently samplable.1 Many realistic settings (e.g., encryptions of ciphertexts,
commitments, or signatures for fixed messages) correspond to not efficiently condition-
ally re-samplable message distributions. So without extra assumptions, lossy encryption
implies only bounded SOA security in a restricted class of settings.
Our approach. We show SOA security using techniques from non-committing, resp.
deniable encryption (e.g., [10, 15, 24, 11]). Non-committing encryption (NCE) schemes
allow for “equivocable” ciphertexts that are computationally indistinguishable from real
1 We remark that it is not obvious from [20] that their IND-SO-CCA secure scheme (Section 4.6)
requires this additional condition on the distribution of the challenge messages. However, if this
condition is not satisfied, then the challenger in the ideal game (in the definition of IND-SO-
CCA security) is inefficient, and as such it cannot be argued in the security proof that in the
ideal game the real public key can be replaced by a lossy key.
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ciphertexts, but can be efficiently opened arbitrarily.2 To achieve security against selec-
tive opening attacks, we rely on an idea from the deniable encryption scheme of Canetti
et al. [11]. In their scheme, an encryption of 0 corresponds to a random string and that
of 1 corresponds to a pseudorandom string (with a sparse range); it is easy to see that
1-encryptions are equivocable and can be opened as both 0 and 1. We will similar ideas
in our schemes, which allows us to turn all SOA challenge ciphertexts into equivo-
cable ones one by one. (Recall that in a sense, the reason why the lossy encryption
paradigm does not mesh well with SO-CCA security is that lossy encryption only pro-
vides a handle to turn all challenge ciphertexts into lossy ones at once.) Finally, when
all challenge ciphertexts are equivocable, we can argue that they do not contain any
information about the unopened messages, and SOA security follows. Unlike previous
constructions based on lossy encryption, we do not change the distribution of the public
key in either our simulation or in the analysis.
We stress that the complexity our scheme does not depend on the number of chal-
lenge ciphertexts. So at the time of, say, constructing a PKI using our scheme, the
number of potentially openable ciphertexts does not have to be known. We also remark
that our approach achieves SOA security against arbitrary message distributions. We
do not need to make extra assumptions on the underlying encryption scheme, or on the
message distribution.
We first showcase our approach with a conceptually very simple scheme that is SO-
CPA secure, i.e., SOA secure against passive attacks. Interestingly, we can base our proof
upon general complexity assumptions, i.e., on the assumption of (a slightly enhanced
version of) trapdoor one-way permutations. Going further, by our discussion above, NCE
techniques do not necessarily suffer from the limitations of lossy encryption when it
comes to active attacks. However, we have yet to describe how to handle decryption
queries in the security proof, and, indeed, the simple SO-CPA secure scheme needs to
be adjusted in several non-trivial ways in order to obtain our SO-CCA secure scheme.
Our scheme. In our SO-CCA secure scheme, encryption of a (multi-bit) message is
performed bitwise, with one ciphertext element per bit. If the plaintext bit is 1, the
corresponding ciphertext element X is an element of the language L associated with
a hash proof system (HPS, cf. [14]). If the bit is 0, the ciphertext element is a random
element, which will most likely be not in L. Additionally, the ciphertext contains an
authentication tag T , whose key K is the HPS key3 associated to X in case X ∈ L
(computed with the help of the witness), and a random key is taken in case X ∈ L.
Decryption checks if the authentication tag T is verified correctly by the HPS key Kˆ
computed from X (by means of the HPS secret key), which is the case iff X ∈ L,
i.e., 1 was encrypted. This approach is somewhat similar to the original Cramer-Shoup
cryptosystem ([13, 14]), only that the HPS keys are used for authentication and not to
directly pad a message.
2 NCE talks about openings in which secret keys, as opposed to encryption randomness, are
released. As a consequence, NCE schemes are comparatively inefficient and have severe limi-
tations (see [28]). Our work shows that when “opening” refers to encryption randomness only,
then NCE techniques allow for quite practical schemes.
3 We adopt the notation of [22, 25] to view a HPS as a key encapsulation mechanism, i.e., to call
HPS instances “ciphertexts” and HPS proofs “keys.”
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Opening a ciphertext part as an encryption of 1 means releasing a witness for X ∈ L.
Opening as an encryption of 0 means releasing the randomness used to randomly sam-
ple X . The crucial observation now is that 1-encryptions are equivocable: to open a 1-
encryption as a 0-encryption, simply claim that X and K were randomly sampled, and
provide the corresponding coins. Hence, equivocating all challenge ciphertexts means
substituting them by all-one encryptions. This can be done as follows. For any X ∈ L,
first the corresponding randomly chosen key K is replaced by the corresponding HPS
key (which does not change the adversary’s view due to statistical properties of the
HPS), and then X is replaced by X ∈ L (which is indistinguishable to the adversary
due to the assumed hardness of L).
In order to have CCA security, it is important that the above changes can be done
(and argued) while at the same time being able to answer decryption queries. This is
indeed the case in our construction since decryption queries can be answered with the
help of the HPS secret key, while the hardness of distinguishing X ∈ L from X ∈ L
holds even when given the HPS secret key.
The formal security proof uses ideas similar to those of Cramer and Shoup. We stress,
however, that our proof is structured quite differently, since additional complications
arise due to the fact that each ciphertext contains several X’s (one for each plaintext bit),
and we have several challenge ciphertexts. Due to this, it will be crucial how exactly
and in which order the challenge ciphertexts are substituted by all-one encryptions.
Furthermore, we need an authentication tag T that allows to “glue” together in a non-
malleable way the L HPS ciphertexts X1, . . . , XL, obtained by encrypting an L-bit
message, via their corresponding keys K1, . . . ,KL.
Cross-authentication code. In order to “glue” HPS ciphertexts together, we make use
of a new kind of information-theoretic authentication technique, which we call cross-
authentication. Recall that in standard authentication, the authentication tag is com-
puted from the message and the key, and can then be used to verify the authenticity
of the message with the help of the key. In a cross-authentication code (XAC), the au-
thentication tag is instead computed from a list K1, . . . ,KL of keys (and there is no
designated message). It should be possible to verify the correctness of the tag T with
any single key Ki from the list, and it should be hard for an adversary to forge a tag T ′
that is accepted by one of the keys, even if the adversary is given all the remaining keys
and a correctly computed tag T . To the best of our knowledge, this concept has not been
studied before. It is an important ingredient to our construction but might also find other
applications as well. We give a formal definition and propose an efficient construction.
Other related work. Dwork et al. [17] study SOA security of commitments, and pro-
vide a connection to the Fiat-Shamir methodology. Hemenway et al. [20] were the first
to devise SO-CCA secure public-key encryption schemes. Their most efficient schemes
have compact ciphertexts of size independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts.
Yet, all their constructions follow the lossy encryption paradigm and thus suffer from
the drawbacks that are inherent to that approach. Hence, unless the lossy encryption
satisfies some additional property, they only prove the weaker IND-SO-CCA security
notion, which in particular requires the distribution of the challenge messages to be
efficiently conditionally re-samplable. Furthermore, the size of their public and secret
keys still depends on the number of challenge ciphertexts. In contrast, our constructions
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are comparatively efficient, completely independent of the number of challenge cipher-
texts, and do not make assumptions about the distribution of the challenge messages
(beyond the usual requirement of being efficiently samplable). Bellare et al. [4] propose
a (passively) SOA secure identity-based encryption scheme that is also based on NCE
techniques. However, their result does not directly yield a SO-CCA secure public-key
encryption scheme, say, by applying the IBE→PKE transformation of Boneh, Canetti,
Halevi, and Katz [8]. (In a nutshell, the reason is that [8] use a one-time signature
scheme that may lose its guarantees under selective opening attacks.)
2 Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈  , let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, k ∈   denotes the
security parameter. For a finite set X , we denote by x ← X the process of sampling x
uniformly from X . For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote y ← A(x;R) the process
of running A on input x and with randomness R, and assigning y the result. We letRA
denote the randomness space of A; we require RA to be of the form RA = {0, 1}r.
We write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x;R) with uniformly chosen R ∈ RA, and we write
y1, . . . , ym ← A(x) for y1 ← A(x), . . . , ym ← A(x) with fresh randomness in each
execution. By timeA = timeA(k) ∈  ∪{∞}, we denote the supremum of the running
time of an algorithm A when running on security parameter k. If timeA is polynomial
in k, then A is PPT.
Trapdoor one-way permutations and collision resistant hashing. Informally, a trap-
door one-way permutation should be hard to invert, unless given a trapdoor.
Definition 1 (Trapdoor one-way permutation). A family of trapdoor one-way per-
mutations F consists of three PPT algorithms Gen, Eval and Inv with the following
properties. Gen(1k) outputs the description of a permutation f : Df → Df and a trap-
door τ , and Eval(f , x) = f (x) and Inv(τ, x) = f −1(x) for all x ∈ Df . Furthermore,
for every PPT algorithm A, the following function is negligible in k:
Pr
[
A(pk, f (x)) = x | (f , τ) ← Gen(1k), x ← Df
]
.
Note that we do not distinguish between the function f and its description output by
Gen. Furthermore, to simplify notation, we usually leave the algorithms Gen, Eval and
Inv implicit and write (f , f −1)← F to denote that a public/secret-key pair is generated
using Gen(1k), and we write f (x) and f −1(x) to denote that Eval(f , x) and Inv(τ, x)
are executed.
Informally, a hash function H is collision resistant if it is infeasible to find two distinct
preimages x, x′ with H(x) = H(x′).
Definition 2 (Collision-resistant hash function). A collision-resistant hash function
H with domain D = Dk and range R = Rk consists of two PPT algorithms Gen
and Eval with the following properties. Gen(1k) outputs the description of a function
H : D → R such that Eval(K,x) = H(x) for all x ∈ D. Furthermore, for every PPT
algorithm B, the following function is negligible in k:
AdvcrH,B(k) := Pr
[
x = x′ ∧ H(x) = H(x′) | H ← Gen(1k), (x, x′) ← B(H)]
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Similarly to above, we do not distinguish between the function H and its description
output by Gen and we usually leave the algorithms Gen and Eval implicit and write
H ← H to denote that H is generated by Gen.
Encryption schemes and security under selective openings. A public-key encryption
scheme consists of three algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec). Key generation Gen(1k) outputs
a public key pk and a secret key sk . Encryption Enc(pk ,M) takes a public key pk and
a message M , and outputs a ciphertext C. Decryption Dec(sk , C) takes a secret key sk
and a ciphertext C, and outputs a message M . For correctness, we want Dec(sk , C) =
M for all M and all (pk , sk) ← Gen(1k), and with overwhelming probability over
C ← (pk ,M).
Following [17, 21, 3, 5, 20], we present a definition for security under selective
openings that captures security of an encryption scheme under adaptive attacks. The
definition is simulation-based (much like semantic security [19]), and demands that
whatever an adversary that sees a vector of ciphertexts deduces can also be deduced by
a simulator that does not see any ciphertexts. To model adaptive corruptions, our notion
also allows both adversary and simulator to request “openings” of adaptively selected
ciphertexts. (Since the simulator does not actually get to see any ciphertexts, it may
only ask to see selected components of an initially unknown message vector.)
Definition 3 (SO-CPA, SO-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) is chosen-plaintext secure under selective openings (short: SO-CPA
secure) iff for every polynomially bounded n = n(k) > 0, every PPT function R, and
every stateful PPT machine A (the adversary), there is a stateful PPT machine S (the
simulator), such that Advcpa-soPKE,A,S,R is negligible. Here
Advcpa-soPKE,A,S,R(k) := Pr
[
Expcpa-so-realPKE,A,R (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expso-idealS,R (k) = 1
]
,
where the experiments Expcca-so-realPKE,A,R (k) and Exp
so-ideal
S,R (k) are defined as follows:
Experiment Expcpa-so-realPKE,A,R
(pk , sk) ← Gen(1k)
M← A(dist, pk )
M := (M i)i∈[n] ←M
R := (Ri)i∈[n] ← (REnc)n
C := (Ci)i∈[n] := (Enc(pk ,M i;Ri))i∈[n]
I ← A(select,C)
outA ← A(output, (M i, Ri)i∈I)
return R(M,M, outA)
Experiment Expso-idealS,R
M← S(dist)
M := (M i)i∈[n] ←M
I ← S(select, (1|Mi|)i∈[n])
outS ← S(output, (M i)i∈I)
return R(M,M, outS)
Furthermore, we define
Advcca-soPKE,A,S,R(k) := Pr
[
Expcca-so-realPKE,A,R (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expso-idealS,R (k) = 1
]
for an experiment Expcca-so-realPKE,A,R that is defined like Expcpa-so-realPKE,A,R , but grants the adversary
(in all stages of the attack) access to a decryption oracle Dec(sk , ·). We require that A
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never queries Dec(sk , ·) on a challenge ciphertext Ci. We say that PKE is chosen-
ciphertext secure under selective openings (short: SO-CCA secure) if for all n, R, and
A there exists S such that Advcca-soPKE,A,S,R(k) is negligible.
A few remarks about Definition 3 are in place:
– We assume that the distributionM that A outputs is encoded as a circuit that sam-
ples n-tuples of messages according to this distribution. Since A is PPT, this en-
forces efficient samplability of M. Efficient samplability of M is a standard and
much weaker requirement than the efficient conditional re-samplability requirement
from the indistinguishability-based selective opening security definitions IND-SO-
ENC [3, 5] or IND-SO-CCA2 [20]. We also note that since A chooses M adap-
tively (i.e., dependent on pk ), SO-CCA security as defined above implies IND-CCA
security (see [2] for a convenient formalization).
– We stress that Definition 3 requires the specified security property to hold for any
(polynomially bounded) n. This is in contrast to the schemes in [20], in which the
public key pk depends on n, so once pk is chosen, security is only guaranteed for
challenge ciphertexts of bounded length.
– Our notion of “opening of a ciphertext” corresponds to sender corruptions: as an
opening, we release plaintext and encryption randomness, but not decryption key.
While this clearly poses a significant restriction, it is in a certain sense the best
we can hope for without resorting to non-black-box or non-committing encryption
techniques (see [21, Section 5]).
– Like [17, 21, 3, 5, 20], we model only one layer of adaptivity. (That is, the adversary
may choose only once a subset of ciphertexts to be opened.) More realistic notions
would model several stages of adaptive corruption, but would also be substantially
more complicated in description and handling. We stress that our SO-CCA secure
encryption scheme to be presented does not rely on the assumption of only one
corruption stage.
– We allow the length of the messages transmitted by the various senders to vary
depending on the randomness of the message distributionM and the identity of the
sender, and we provide this information (i.e. the message lengths |M1|, . . . , |Mn|)
to the simulator. Indeed, we cannot prevent the adversary from always choosing to
corrupt the n/2 senders that send the longest messages.
Sender-equivocable encryption schemes. We formalize the notion of sender equiv-
ocability, which (for CPA security) is similar to non-committing encryption except the
adversary is only allowed to corrupt the sender but not the receiver. In addition, we
require that to equivocate, the simulator only needs to know the random coins used to
generate the simulated ciphertext (and not those for the simulated public key). This lat-
ter requirement is needed because unlike the set-up for non-committing encryption, all
ciphertexts are generated using the same public key in the selective opening attacks.
Definition 4 (NC-CPA, NC-CCA security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE =
(Gen,Enc,Dec) is sender-equivocable (short: NC-CPA secure) iff there is a stateful
PPT machine S (the simulator) such that for every stateful PPT machine A (the adver-
sary) Advcpa-ncPKE,A,S is negligible. Here
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Advcpa-ncPKE,A,S(k) := Pr
[
Expcpa-nc-realPKE,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expcpa-nc-idealPKE,A (k) = 1
]
,
where the experiments Expcca-nc-realPKE,A (k) and Exp
cpa-nc-ideal
PKE,A (k) are defined as follows:
Experiment Expcpa-nc-realPKE,A
(pk , sk) ← Gen(1k)
(M, z)← A(dist, pk )
R ←REnc
C := Enc(pk ,M ;R)
return A(output,M,C,R, z)
Experiment Expcpa-nc-idealPKE,A
(pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
(M, z)← A(dist, pk)
C ← S(sim, pk , 1|M|)
R ← S(open,M)
return A(output,M,C,R, z)
Furthermore, we define
Advcca-ncPKE,A,S(k) := Pr
[
Expcca-nc-realPKE,A (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expcca-nc-idealPKE,A (k) = 1
]
for an experiment Expcca-nc-realPKE,A that is defined like Expcpa-nc-realPKE,A but grants the adversary
A (in all stages of the attack) access to a decryption oracle Dec(sk , ·). We also consider
an experiment Expcca-nc-idealPKE,A that is defined like Expcpa-nc-idealPKE,A , but also grants A access
to Dec(sk , ·). In both experiments, we require that A never queries Dec(sk , ·) on the
challenge ciphertext C. We say that PKE is chosen-ciphertext secure under selective
openings (short: NC-CCA secure) if there exists S such that for all A, Advcca-ncPKE,A,S(k)
is negligible.
The next lemma says that if an encryption scheme is NC-CPA secure (resp. NC-CCA
secure), then it is also SOCPA secure (resp. SOCCA secure). An analogous statement
was shown in [10] in the context of non-committing encryption and adaptive corrup-
tions; the main technical difference is that we achieve security amidst selective opening
attacks with respect to a single public key.
Lemma 1 (NC-CPA security implies SO-CPA security). Suppose PKE is NC-CPA
secure with simulator S. Then, for every adversary A and every function R, there exists
an adversary B and a simulator S′, such that
∣∣
∣Advcpa-soPKE,A,S′,R(k)
∣∣
∣ ≤ n
∣∣
∣Advcpa-ncPKE,B,S(k)
∣∣
∣ . (1)
We have timeS′ ≈ timeA + n · timeS + timeR. Moreover, if PKE is NC-CCA secure,
then we have that
∣
∣Advcca-soPKE,A,S′,R(k)
∣
∣ ≤ n ∣∣Advcca-ncPKE,B,S(k)
∣
∣ . (2)
with the same relation timeS′ ≈ timeA + n · timeS + timeR.
The proof idea is very simple: the SOCPA simulator S′ generates n equivocable cipher-
texts independently, one for each sender and forward these ciphertexts to the adversary
A. When A asks for an opening set I , S′ relays this set to its own experiment, receives
the corresponding messages in I , and opens the ciphertexts in the simulation suitably.
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Proof (sketch). We first establish the claim for NC-CPA vs SO-CPA. Here, the simula-
tor S′ internally simulates a copy of A and proceeds as follows:
– On input dist, run (pk , sk)← Gen(1k) and outputM← A(dist, pk );
– On input (select, (1|Mi|)i∈[n]), run C = (Ci)i∈[n] ← (S(sim, pk , 1|Mi|))i∈[n]
and output I ← A(select,C)
– On input (output, (M i)i∈I), compute Ri ← S(open,M i) for i ∈ I and return
outA ← A(output, (M i, Ri)i∈I)
The analysis proceeds via a series of games, where in Game j, j = 0, 1, . . . , n, the
first j ciphertexts are generated using S(sim, pk), and the corresponding randomness
using S(open, pk ,M i). The last n−j ciphertexts are generated using Enc(pk ,M i;Ri)
with randomness Ri. We claim that the sum (over j = 1, . . . , n) of the distinguishing
probabilities between Game j − 1 and Game j is bounded by nAdvcpa-ncPKE,B,S(k), where
B uniformly guesses j ∈ [n], and internally simulates a copy of A as follows:
– On input dist, pk , computeM← A(dist, pk ) and M = (M i)i∈[n] ←M, and
output (M, z) = (Mj ,M).
– On input (output,M,C,R, z), compute
Ci =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
S(sim, pk , 1|M
i|) if i < j
C if i = j
Enc(pk ,M i;Ri) if i > j
compute I ← A(select,C), outA ← A(output, (M i, Ri)i∈I) and output
R(M,M, outA).
For NC-CCA vs SO-CCA, the simulator is exactly as above, except it also simulates
Dec(sk , ·) which it can since it knows (pk , sk).
3 Warmup: An NC-CPA Secure Scheme
We focus on constructing NC-CPA and NC-CCA secure schemes, which by Lemma 1,
are respectively SO-CPA and SO-CCA secure.
Ingredients. As a warmup for our NC-CCA secure scheme, and to explain one of the
key ideas, we construct an efficient NC-CPA secure scheme from a slightly enhanced
version of trapdoor one-way permutations. Namely, we require that there exist algo-
rithms for sampling the domain Df , and for explaining an arbitrary x ∈ Df as a result
of sampling Df :
Definition 5 (Efficiently samplable and explainable domain). A domain Df is effi-
ciently samplable and explainable iff there exist PPT algorithms Sample and Explain
such that Sample(Df ;R) is uniformly distributed over Df for R ← RSample, and
Explain(Df , x) outputs R that is uniformly distributed subject to Sample(Df ;R) = x
for any x ∈ Df .
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Explainability is a vital property in the construction of non-committing encryption
schemes (see Damga˚rd and Nielsen [15]; there, an essentially equivalent property is
called “invertible sampling”). We stress that the domain of most “natural” trapdoor
one-way permutations satisfies Definition 5.4 Note that for families of trapdoor one-
way permutations, explainability implies that the family is enhanced in the sense of
Goldreich [18], Appendix C.1.
Hence, let F be a family of trapdoor one-way permutations f : Df → Df with
efficiently samplable and explainable domain Df (for every f ∈ F), and hard-core
predicate h : Df → {0, 1}. For (f , f −1) ← F and  = (k), define
BMf ,(x) := (h(x), h(f (x)), . . . , h(f −1(x))) ∈ {0, 1}.
It is well-known that BM is pseudorandom, even given f (x). Formally:
Theorem 1 (Blum and Micali [6]). Let F a family of trapdoor one-way permutations
f : Df → Df with hard-core predicate h : Df → {0, 1}. Then, for every PPT distin-
guisher D and every polynomially bounded  = (k), the function
AdvprgF ,,D(k) := Pr
[
D(f (x),BMf ,(x)) = 1
]− Pr [D(x,K) = 1]
is negligible in k, where (f , f −1) ← F , x ← Df , and K ← {0, 1}k.
The scheme. For F as above and a message space of {0, 1}, our NC-CPA secure
encryption scheme NCCPA = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is defined as:
Gen(1k). Sample (f , f −1) ← F , and return (pk , sk) = (f , f −1).
Enc(pk ,M ;R). Parse pk = f , M ∈ {0, 1}, and R = (Rx,K0) ∈ RSample × {0, 1}k.
Set x← Sample(Df ;Rx) and return
C := (y,K) :=
{
(f k(x),BMf ,k(x)) if M = 1
(x,K0) if M = 0.
Dec(sk , C). Parse sk = f −1 and C = (y,K). Return M = 1 if BMf ,k(f −k(y)) = K ,
and M = 0 else.5
Note that 1-encryptions are always correctly decrypted, while 0-encryptions are wrongly
decrypted to 1 with probability 2−k. Furthermore, larger messages can be encrypted by
concatenating ciphertexts. (This does not affect NCCPA’s NC-CPA security.)
Equivocable ciphertexts and sketch of security proof. The key to proving NC-CPA
security is that 1-encryptions are equivocable. More concretely, the NC-CPA simulator
S proceeds as follows:
4 Damga˚rd and Nielsen [15] show that any dense subset Df of an efficient samplable domain
is both efficiently samplable and explainable as long as Df admits an efficient membership
test. For the trapdoor permutations based on RSA, the public index is a RSA modulus N and
the domain  ∗N clearly satisfies these properties. For Rabin’s trapdoor permutations based on
modular squaring, the public index is a Blum integer N and we need to modify the domain to
be the group of signed quadratic residues in  ∗N .
5 Note that BMf ,k(f −k(y)) can be computed from f −1 and y alone.
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– On input (sim, pk) where pk is the public key f , it returns a random 1-encryption
given by (y,K) = (f k(x),BMf ,k(x)) with randomness R;
– On input (open,M) for M ∈ {0, 1}, it returns (Explain(Df , y),K) if M = 0 and
R if M = 1.
A straightforward hybrid argument to BM’s pseudorandomness shows that this simu-
lation achieves a computationally indistinguishable view for A in real experiment and
ideal simulation. We obtain:
Theorem 2 (NCCPA is NC-CPA secure). For every adversary A and every function
R, there exists a simulator S, and a distinguisher D, such that
∣∣
∣Advcpa-soSOCCA,A,S,R(k)
∣∣
∣ ≤ n
∣∣
∣AdvprgF ,k,D(k)
∣∣
∣ . (3)
We have timeS ≈ timeA and timeD ≈ timeA + timeR.
We omit a more detailed proof, since the proof of Theorem 2 is similar to, but concep-
tually simpler than the upcoming proof for our NC-CCA secure scheme.
Relation to non-committing encryption. We point out that NCCPA can be seen as
a variant of non-committing encryption schemes in [10, 24]. Compared with these
schemes, our scheme is more efficient and conceptually simpler. It also allows for an
unbounded usage, since we only need to provide encryption random coins (but not se-
cret keys) upon an opening. As such, NCCPA serves as a useful tool to explain how
we use equivocable ciphertexts to prove security under selective openings. The main
technical difficulties lie in designing and analyzing a chosen-ciphertext secure scheme.
This will turn out to be a delicate task that requires some more preparation.
4 Hash Proof Systems with Explainable Domains
We recall the notions of a subset membership problem and of an (extended) hash proof
system, as introduced in Cramer and Shoup [14]. In our definitions, we require all prop-
erties to hold perfectly; this can be relaxed by allowing a negligibly small error proba-
bility (which includes that sampling algorithms may produce near-uniform output).
Definition 6 (Subset membership problem). A subset membership problemSMPcon-
sists of the following PPT algorithms.
System parameter generation. SysGen(1k) outputs system parameters ρ that defines
a set Xρ of ciphertexts and a language Lρ ⊆ Xρ. Xρ is required to be efficiently
recognizable (given ρ).
Sampling from Lρ. SampleL(Lρ;W ) uniformly samples X ← Lρ using randomness
W .
A subset membership problem SMP is called hard iff Xρ and Lρ are computationally
indistinguishable. Concretely, for every PPT distinguisher D, the following function is
negligible:
AdvsmEHPS,D(k) := Pr [D(X) = 1 | X ← Xρ \ Lρ]− Pr [D(X) = 1 | X ← Lρ]
where in both probabilities ρ ← SysGen(1k).
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Definition 7 (EHPS). An extended hash proof system (short: EHPS) EHPS for a sub-
set membership problem SMP associates with each ρ ← SysGen(1k) an efficiently
recognizable set of keys Kρ and an efficiently recognizable set of tags Tρ, and consists
of the following PPT algorithms:
Individual key generation. HashGen(ρ) outputs a public key hpk and a secret key hsk .
We assume that hpk and hsk both contain ρ.
Secret evaluation. SEval(hsk , X, t) computes a key K ∈ Kρ. We also write K =
hsk (X, t).
Public evaluation (with witness). PEval(hpk , X,W, t) computes a key K ∈ Kρ. We
require correctness in the sense of PEval(hpk , X,W, t) = SEval(hsk , X, t) for all
ρ ← SysGen(1k), (hpk , hsk ) ← HashGen(ρ), X ← SampleL(Lρ;W ), and all
t ∈ Tρ.
By definition, in an EHPS the public key hpk uniquely determines the action of SEval
for ciphertexts X ∈ Lρ. An EHPS typically becomes interesting/useful when on the
other hand the action of SEval for ciphtertexts X ∈ Xρ \ Lρ is “very undetermined”.
We capture this as follows.
Definition 8 (2-universal). An EHPS (for SMP) is 2-universal iff for all possible ρ ←
SysGen(1k), all hpk in the range of HashGen(ρ), and all distinct (X1, t1), (X2, t2) in
(Xρ\Lρ)× T ,
Pr
[
hsk (X2, t2) = K2
∣∣ hsk (X1, t1) = K1
]
=
1
|Kρ| ,
where the probability is over possible hsk with (hpk , hsk)← HashGen(ρ).
In addition to the above (standard) properties, we will also need the following non-
standard requirements.
Definition 9 (Sparseness of the language). An subset membership problem SMP has
a sparse language if for ρ ← SysGen(1k) and X ← Xρ, the probability that X ∈ Lρ is
negligible.
Definition 10 (Explainable ciphertexts and keys). We say that a subset membership
problem SMP has explainable ciphertexts if the set Xρ is efficiently samplable and
explainable in the sense of Definition 5. Similarly, an extended hash proof system EHPS
has explainable keys if the set Kρ is efficiently samplable and explainable.
We point out that explainable keys can actually be assumed without loss of generality,
because Kρ can always be efficiently mapped into K′ρ = {0, 1}m by means of a suit-
able (almost) balanced function, such that uniform distribution in Kρ induces (almost)
uniform distribution in K′ρ, and where m is linear in log(|Kρ|). The requirement on the
ciphertexts to be explainable, on the other hand, is a real restriction on the SMP; never-
theless, several suitable SMPs do satisfy this requirement and have a sparse language,
as we will outline next.
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Examples of suitable SMPs. The DDH-based SMPs from Cramer and Shoup [14] sat-
isfy all our requirements, assuming that the platform group  is efficiently samplable
and explainable in the sense of Definition 5. One popular such group in which DDH
is assumed to be hard is the unique q-order subgroup of ∗p, where p = 2q + 1 is a
safe prime. Another one is the elliptic curve 1 from [7, Section 5.1]. The Paillier-
based SMP from [14] fulfils our requirements as well. Finally, the SMP from [14]
based on quadratic residuosity satisfies all our requirements except for a sparse lan-
guage (Definition 9). However, the SMP that consists of, say, k parallel copies of the
QR SMP from [14] (and where the EHPS key is the product of the individual keys) has
a sparse language and satisfies our remaining requirements.
5 Cross-Authentication Codes
We introduce here a new information-theoretic authentication technique, which will
play an important role in our construction of a SO-CCA-secure encryption scheme.
However, the technique may also be useful in other contexts. Cross-authentication, as
we call our technique, allows to compute an authentication tag T for a list K1, . . . ,KL
of keys, with the following two properties. The tag T can be verified by any single key
Ki from the list, and without knowledge of Ki it is information-theoretically hard to
forge a tag T ′ that is correctly verified by Ki, even when given a correctly computed
tag T and all the other keys K =i = (Kj)j =i.
Below is the formal definition followed by an efficient example construction.
Definition 11 (L-Cross-authentication code). For L ∈  , an L-cross-authentication
code (short: L-XAC) XAC consists of a key space XK and a tag spaceXT and of three
PPT algorithms XGen, XAuth and XVer. XGen(1k) produces a uniformly random key
K ∈ XK, XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL) outputs a tag T ∈ XT , and XVer(K, i, T ) outputs a
decision bit. The following is required:
Correctness. For all i ∈ [L], the probability
failXAC(k) := Pr [XVer(Ki, i,XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL)) = 1] ,
is negligible, where K1, . . . ,KL ← XGen(1k) in the probability.
Security against impersonation and substitution attacks. AdvimpXAC(k) and Adv
sub
XAC(k)
as defined below are both negligible:
AdvimpXAC(k) := maxi,T ′
Pr
[
XVer(K, i, T ′) = 1 | K ← XGen(1k)]
where the max is over all i ∈ [L] and T ′ ∈ XT , and
AdvsubXAC(k) := max
i,K =i,F
Pr
⎡
⎣T
′ = T ∧
XVer(Ki, i, T ′) = 1
∣
∣
∣
∣∣
Ki ← XGen(1k),
T := XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL),
T ′ ← F (T )
⎤
⎦ .
where the max is over all i ∈ [L], all K =i = (Kj)j =i ∈ XKL−1 and all (possibly
randomized) functions F : XT → XT .
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Note that by taking RXGen as key space, instead of XK, we may without loss of gen-
erality assume that XK is of the form XK = {0, 1}r (and XGen simply outputs its
randomness).
Example of a L-XAC. Let  be a finite field of size q, where q depends on k (e.g. q =
2k). Set XK = 2 and XT = L ∪ {⊥}, and let XGen produce a random key in
XK = 2. For K1 = (a1, b1), . . . ,KL = (aL, bL) ∈ XK, the authentication tag T =
XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL) is given by the unique vector T = (T0, . . . , TL−1) ∈ L such that
pT (ai) = bi for i = 1, . . . , L, where pT (x) = T0 + T1x + · · · + TL−1xL−1 ∈ [x].
T can be computed efficiently by solving the linear equation system AT = B, where
A ∈ L×L is the Vandermonde matrix whose i-th row is given by 1, ai, a2i . . . , aL−1i ,
and where B ∈ L is the column vector with entries b1, . . . , bL. If AT = B admits
more than one or no solution, then T is set to ⊥ instead. For any T ∈ XT , K =
(a, b) ∈ XK and i ∈ [L], the verification XVer(K, i, T ) outputs 1 if and only if T =⊥
and pT (a) = b.
Lemma 2. The above L-XAC XAC satisfies:
failXAC(k) ≤ L(L− 1)2q , Adv
imp
XAC(k) ≤
1
q
and AdvsubXAC(k) ≤ 2 ·
L− 1
q
.
Proof. Correctness: By construction, XVer(Ki, i,XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL)) = 1 except if
the Vandermonde matrix A is singular. The Vandermonde determinant det(A) is well
known to be non-zero unless ai = aj for some i = j, where the latter happens with
probability at most 12L(L− 1)/||.
Security against impersonation attack: Consider an arbitrary but fixed T ′ ∈ XT . If
T ′ =⊥ then XVer(K, i, T ) = 0 for any choice of K and i. Else, if T ′ ∈ L, then the
probability (over the uniformly random choice of b) that pT ′(a) = b is 1/||.
Security against substitution attack: Consider an arbitrary i ∈ [L]. For concrete-
ness, but without loss of generality, we may assume i = L. We fix arbitrary values
for K1 = (a1, b1), . . . ,KL−1 = (aL−1, bL−1). We may assume those ai’s to be pair-
wise distinct, since otherwise T will be ⊥ for any choice of KL and then the proba-
bility of finding T ′ that is accepted by KL is upper bounded by AdvimpXAC(k). We first
slightly modify the computation of T as follows. Instead of setting T to ⊥ as soon as
det(A) = 0, we distinguish between the case where AT = B has no solution and
where it has multiple solutions for T . In the former case, T is still set to ⊥, but in the
latter, T is chosen uniformly at random from all the solutions. Note that this modifi-
cation makes the computation of T randomized (at least in general), but the definition
of AdvsubXAC(k) still makes sense. This modification changes the value of AdvsubXAC(k) by
at most εmulti = Pr [AT =B has multiple solutions ], where the probability is over the
choice of KL.
In the following argument, we consider the above modified version of XAC. The
probability AdvsubXAC(k) is upper bounded by the corresponding probability conditioned
on T =⊥ plus the probability that T =⊥. Since the latter probability equals εno =
Pr [AT =B has no solution ], we can focus on the former while book-keeping the “er-
ror” accumulated so far: εmulti + εno = Pr [det(A)=0] = Pr [aL ∈ {a1, . . . , aL−1}] =
(L − 1)/||. In the following argument, we consider an arbitrary T =⊥, and we
consider the corresponding (conditional) probability distribution of KL. It holds that
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KL = (aL, bL) is uniformly distributed in 2 subject to pT (aL) = bL. This in par-
ticular implies that aL on its own is uniformly distributed. Consider now an arbitrary
choice for T ′ ∈ XT (computed from K1, . . . ,KL−1 and T ). T ′ is required to be dif-
ferent from T , and we may assume that T ′ =⊥, since otherwise XVer(K,L, T ) = 0
holds with certainty. By linearity, pT ′(aL) = bL holds exactly if pT ′−T (aL) = 0.
However, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, pT ′−T (aL) = 0 holds with probability at
most deg(pT ′−T (x))/|| ≤ (L − 1)/|| for a uniformly random aL ∈ . Taking into
account εmulti and εno from further up, this proves the claim.
6 Our NC-CCA Secure Scheme
Ingredients. For our encryption scheme with message space {0, 1}L, we need the
following.
1. A hard subset membership problem SMP with sparse languageLρ and explainable
ciphertexts Xρ.
2. A 2-universal extended hash proof system EHPS for SMP with tags Tρ and ex-
plainable keys Kρ.
3. A collision-resistant hash functionH with domain (Xρ)L and range Tρ.
4. An L-cross-authentication code XAC with key space XK = Kρ and tag space XT .
From the remarks after Definition 10 and 11 it follows that the efficient samplability
and explainability of Kρ and the requirement on XK to coincide with Kρ pose no real
restriction. In fact, all of these ingredients exist under standard number-theoretic as-
sumptions such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH), decisional composite residuosity
(DCR), and quadratic residuosity (QR).
The scheme. We define our encryption scheme NCCCA = (Gen,Enc,Dec) as follows:
Gen(1k). Run ρ ← SysGen(1k), (hpk , hsk) ← HashGen(ρ) and H ← H. Return
public key pk = (hpk ,H) and secret key sk = (hsk ,H).
Enc(pk ,M ;R). Parse pk = (hpk ,H), M = (M1, . . . ,ML) ∈ {0, 1}L, and R =
(Wi, RXi , R
K
i )i∈[L] ∈ (RSampleL ×RSample ×RSample)L. For i ∈ [L], set
Xi :=
{
Sample(Xρ;RXi ) ∈ Xρ if Mi = 0
SampleL(Lρ;Wi) ∈ Lρ if Mi = 1
,
and compute t := H(X1, . . . , XL). Then, for i ∈ [L], set the keys
Ki :=
{
Sample(Kρ;RKi ) if Mi = 0
PEval(hpk , Xi,Wi, t) if Mi = 1
and compute the tag T := XAuth(K1, . . . ,KL). Return C = (X1, . . . , XL, T ).
Dec(sk , C). Parse sk = (hsk ,H) and C = (X1, . . . , XL, T ) ∈ XLρ × XT . Set t :=
H(X1, . . . , XL). For i ∈ [L], let Ki := hsk(Xi, t), and Mi := XVer(Ki, i, T ).
Return M := (M1, . . . ,ML).
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Lemma 3 (Correctness of NCCCA). For any pk in the range of Gen, any M , and
any C ← Enc(pk ,M), we have Dec(sk , C) = M except with probability at most
L ·max{AdvimpXAC(k), failXAC(k)}.
Proof. If Mi = 1, then Ki = hsk (Xi, t) = PEval(hpk , Xi,Wi, t) = Ki by com-
pleteness of EHPS, and so XVer(Ki, i, T ) = 1 except with probability failXAC(k) by
correctness of XAC. On the other hand, for Mi = 0, EHPS’s universality implies that
Ki = hsk (Xf , t) is uniformly random, even given pk , C, and M . Hence, the proba-
bility that XVer(Ki, i, T ) = 1 is at most AdvimpXAC(k). The statement follows by a union
bound over i ∈ [L].
Equivocable ciphertexts. As with our earlier scheme NCCPA, NCCCA has the prop-
erty that 1-encryptions are equivocable. Specifically, we can construct a NC-CCA sim-
ulator S that proceeds as follows:
– On input (sim, pk , 1L) where pk is the public key (hpk ,H), it generates an equiv-
ocable ciphertext of the form
C = (X ′1, . . . , X
′
L, T ) = (SampleL(Lρ;W ′1), . . . ,SampleL(Lρ;W ′L), T ) (4)
for uniformly chosen W ′i ∈ RSampleL and T := XAuth(K ′1, . . . ,K ′L) with K ′i :=
PEval(hpk , Xi,Wi, t).
– On input (open,M) for an arbitrary M ∈ {0, 1}L, such a C can be explained
as an encryption of M by releasing R =
(
Wi, R
X
i , R
K
i
)
i∈[L] with Wi = W
′
i if
Mi = 1, and (RXi , RKi ) = (Explain(Xρ, X ′i),Explain(Kρ,K ′i)) if Mi = 0.
Our security proof shows that equivocated ciphertexts and their openings are indistin-
guishable from authentic ones, even given a decryption oracle.
7 Security Analysis
Theorem 3 (NCCCA is NC-CCA secure). There exists a simulator S such that for
every adversary A there exists a subset membership distinguisher D and an adversary
B on H’s collision resistance property such that timeD, timeB ≈ timeA and
∣
∣Advcca-ncNCCCA,A,S(k)
∣
∣ ≤ L·∣∣AdvsmEHPS,D(k)
∣
∣+2L2q·AdvxacXAC(k)+AdvcrH,B(k)+
L(L− 1)
|Lρ| ,
(5)
where AdvxacXAC(k) = max
{
AdvsubXAC(k),Adv
imp
XAC(k)
}
and q is an upper bound on the
number of decryption queries A performs.
Before going into the formal proof below, we briefly give a high-level description of
the reasoning. The goal is to replace the challenge ciphertext by an equivocable cipher-
text. We replace the challenge ciphertexts as follows, one-by-one for every X∗m (that
is not already in Lρ) within every challenge ciphertext C∗. First, instead of choosing
the corresponding key K∗m at random whenever Mm = 0, K∗m is always computed as
HPS key K∗m = hsk (X∗m, t∗). Next, X∗m ∈ Lρ is replaced by X∗m ∈ Lρ, yielding an
equivocable ciphertext.
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We now briefly argue why these modifications do not (significantly) alter the adver-
sary A’s view. In order to argue that the modification to the choice of K∗m does not
change A’s view, it is crucial that A has no information on the HPS secret key hsk
beyond the public key hpk . In order to guarantee this, we first slightly modify the de-
cryption procedure Dec used to answer the decryption queries so that Dec does not
make any use of hsk : rather than verifying the XAC tag Ti, the decrypted message bit
Mi is directly set to 0 whenever Xi ∈ Lρ. By universality of the hash proof system and
the security of XAC against impersonation attacks, it follows that this modification does
not significantly change A’s view. Note that with this modified decryption procedure,
the resulting game is not efficient anymore, but this fine for arguing that choosing K∗m
as HPS key instead of random does not change A’s view, since this is an information-
theoretic argument. However, this step would be a problem for justifying the switch
from X∗m ∈ Lρ to X∗m ∈ Lρ. Therefore, before doing the latter switch, the modi-
fied decryption procedure is replaced again by the original procedure Dec. Again, this
change to the decryption procedure can be argued to have little effect on A’s view by
universality of the hash proof system and security of XAC. However, in this case things
are slightly more subtle because if Xi = X∗m and t = t∗, then A now knows an XAC tag
that is verified by the HPS key Ki = hsk(Xi, t), namely T ∗. But if indeed t = t∗ then
the collision resistance of H ensures that A has to submit a different XAC tag. Hence se-
curity against substitution attacks of XAC ensures that the tag will be rejected. Thus both
decryption processes decrypt to the same message bit and are hence indistinguishable.
Proof. We proceed in a series of games. Generally, we will denote the output of Game
i by out i.
Game −2 is the original real experiment Expcca-nc-realNCCCA,A. By definition,
Pr [out−2 = 1] = Expcca-nc-realNCCCA,A(k). (6)
Let M∗ = (M∗1 , . . . ,M∗ ) denote the message chosen by A; C∗ be the challenge cipher-
text handed to A; and Cj be A’s j-th decryption query. Write C∗ = (X∗1 , . . . , X∗L, T ∗),
Cj = (Xj1 , . . . , X
j
L, T
j), and similarly for the variables t∗, Kji , etc. Without loss of
generality, we assume that A always makes q = q(k) decryption queries.
In Game−1, we abort the experiment (with output 1) as soon as X∗i = X∗i′ for some
distinct i, i′ ∈ [L]. A counting argument and a union bound show
|Pr [out−1 = 1]− Pr [out−2 = 1]| ≤ L(L− 1)|Lρ| . (7)
In Game 0, we abort the experiment (with output 1) as soon as A submits a decryp-
tion query Cj with
tj = H(Xj1 , . . . , X
j
L) = (X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
L) = t
∗
for some . A straightforward reduction shows that
Pr [out0 = 1]− Pr [out−1 = 1] = AdvcrH,B(k) (8)
for a suitable B that simulates Game 0.6
6 If H is only target collision resistant, a reduction with a multiplicative loss of q can be con-
ducted.
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From Game 0 up to Game L, we will stepwise replace the challenge ciphertext
C∗ with an equivocable ciphertext of the form (4). Specifically, Game m with 0 ≤
m ≤ L coincides with Game 0 except that X∗i and K∗i with i ≤ m are computed as
X∗i := SampleL(Lρ;W ∗i ) ∈ Lρ and K∗i := PEval(hpk , X∗i ,W ∗i , t), no matter what
M∗i is, and X∗i is opened suitably to M∗i as explained at the end of Section 6. Looking
ahead, we point out that the final Game L, in which C∗ is equivocable, is identical to
the ideal experiment Expcca-nc-idealNCCCA,S for the simulator S described earlier. We now show
indistinguishability between Games m and m + 1 for any 0 ≤ m ≤ L− 1. We do this
in several steps.
Game m.1 is identical to Game m above.
In Game m.2, we slightly modify the decryption oracle. Recall that from each EHPS
ciphertext Xi of a decryption query C, a key Ki = hsk(Xi, t) is computed and Mi :=
XVer(Ki, i, T ) is returned. We change this to Mi := 0 iff Xi is inconsistent in the sense
of Xi /∈ Lρ. (Note that this makes Game m.2 inefficient.)
Let badm.i.1 denote the event that in Game m.1, there is a EHPS ciphertext Xi in
some Cj that is inconsistent in the sense Xi /∈ Lρ, but XVer(Ki, i, T ) = 1. Let badm.2
be the corresponding event in Game m.2. By construction, it holds that Game m.1 and
Game m.2 are identical as long as the respective events badm.1 and badm.2 do not
occur, and Pr [badm.1] = Pr [badm.2]. We postpone the proof of the following claim:
Lemma 4. Pr [badm.2] ≤ Lq · AdvimpXAC(k).
It follows that
|Pr [outm.2 = 1]− Pr [outm.1 = 1]| ≤ Pr [badm.2] ≤ Lq · AdvimpXAC(k) . (9)
Note that the adversary’s view in Game m.2 depends only on hpk . Namely, while the
experiment uses hsk to decrypt consistent EHPS ciphertexts efficiently, by complete-
ness of EHPS, this does not release any information on hsk beyond hpk .
In Game m.3, instead of choosing K∗m ∈ Kρ uniformly, using Sample, if M∗m = 0,
we compute
K∗m := hsk(X
∗
m, t
∗)
as in a hypothetical decryption of C∗. (Later, if C∗ is to be opened, K∗m is explained
as being randomly through Sample(Kρ), using coins Explain(Kρ,K∗m).) Since the only
information about hsk beyond hpk is released while computing K∗m, the universality of
EHPS guarantees that K∗m looks uniform. Concretely,
Pr [outm.3 = 1] = Pr [outm.2 = 1] . (10)
In Game m.4, we reverse the changes from Game m.2. That is, decryption does not
set Mi := 1 iff Xi ∈ Lρ, but again computes Mi := XVer(Ki, i, T ). Note that this
makes Game m.4 efficient again.
Let badm.3 denote the event that in Game m.3, there is a EHPS ciphertext Xi in
some Cj that is inconsistent in the sense Xi /∈ Lρ, but XVer(Ki, i, T ) = 1. Let badm.4
be the corresponding event in Game m.4. Similar to above, it holds that Game m.3
and Game m.4 are identical as long as the respective events badm.3 and badm.4 do not
occur, and Pr [badm.3] = Pr [badm.4]. We postpone the proof of the following claim:
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Lemma 5. Pr [badm.3] ≤ Lq ·max
{
AdvsubXAC(k),Adv
imp
XAC(k)
}
.
Writing AdvxacXAC(k) := max
{
AdvsubXAC(k),Adv
imp
XAC(k)
}
, it follows that
|Pr [outm.4 = 1]− Pr [outm.3 = 1]| ≤ Pr [badm.3] ≤ Lq · AdvxacXAC(k). (11)
In Game m.5, we do not sample a random X∗m ← Xρ if M∗m = 0, but instead a con-
sistent X∗m ∈ Lρ. Concretely, the experiment always runs X∗m ← SampleL(Lρ;W ∗m).
(Later, if C∗ is to be opened, X∗m is explained as being randomly through Sample(Xρ),
using random coins Explain(Xρ, X∗m).) Since Game m.4 is again efficient , we can use
the subset membership assumption to obtain
1
L
∑
m∈[L]
(Pr [outm.5 = 1]− Pr [outm.4 = 1]) = AdvsmEHPS,D(k) (12)
for a suitable D that guesses m uniformly and simulates Game m.4, resp. Game m.5,
(implicitly) depending on its challenge.
Because K∗m = hsk (X∗m, t∗) = PEval(hpk , C∗m,W ∗m, t∗) in Game m.5, Game m.5
is nothing but a reformulation of Game m + 1. Hence, summing up (9,10,11,12) over
m ∈ [L] yields
|Pr [outL=1]− Pr [out0=1]| ≤ L ·
∣
∣AdvsmEHPS,D(k)
∣
∣ + 2L2q · AdvxacXAC(k). (13)
It is left to observe that in Game L, the experiment is exactly that of Expso-idealNCCCA,S for
the NC-CCA simulator S described earlier. Therefore,
Pr
[
Expso-idealNCCCA,S(k) = 1
]
= Pr [outL = 1] . (14)
Combining (6,7,8,13,14) finishes the proof.
We catch up with the proofs of the two technical lemmas:
Proof (of Lemma 4). Let badm.2.j.i denote the event that in Game m.2, the EHPS ci-
phertext Xi in some Cj is inconsistent in the sense Xi /∈ Lρ, but XVer(Kji , i, T j) = 1.
Note badm.2 =
∨
(j,i)∈[q]×[L] badm.2.j.i.
Fix (j, i) ∈ [q] × [L]. If Xji /∈ Lρ, universality of EHPS implies that K
j
i =
hsk(Xji , t
j) is uniformly random and independent of A’s view. (Recall that A’s view in
Game m.2 depends only on hpk .) Hence
Pr [badm.2.j.i] ≤ AdvimpXAC(k),
and a union bound over j and i shows the claim.
Proof (of Lemma 5). Let badm.3.j.i denote the event that in Game m.3, the EHPS ci-
phertext Xi in some Cj is inconsistent in the sense Xi /∈ Lρ, but XVer(Kji , i, T j) = 1.
Note badm.3 =
∨
(j,i)∈[q]×[L] badm.3.j.i.
Fix (j, i) ∈ [q] × [L]. We may assume that Xji /∈ Lρ (as necessary for badm.3.j.i).
Suppose first that (Xji , tj) = (X∗m, t∗). Recall that A’s information on hsk in Game
m.3 is restricted to hpk and K∗m = hsk(X∗m, t∗). Thus, EHPS’s 2-universality implies
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that Kji = hsk(X
j
i , t
j) is uniformly random and independent of A’s view. By XAC’s
security against impersonation attacks,
Pr
[
badm.3.j.i | (Xji , tj) = (X∗m, t∗)
]
≤ AdvimpXAC(k). (15)
Now suppose (Xji , tj) = (X∗m, t∗). By our changes in Games 0 and 1, we may assume
that (Xji′)i′∈[L] = (X∗i′)i′∈[L], so that necessarily m = i and K
j
i = K
∗
i = hsk (X
∗
i , t
∗).
Furthermore, for the decryption query to be valid, T j = T ∗ has to hold. EHPS’s univer-
sality implies that K∗i = hsk(X∗i , t∗) is uniformly distributed and the only information
A has on K∗i is T ∗. By XAC’s security against substitution attacks,
Pr
[
badm.3.j.m | (Xji , tj) = (X∗m, t∗)
]
≤ AdvsubXAC(k). (16)
A union bound and summing up (15,16) shows the inequality part of the lemma. The
equality part follows by noting Pr [badm.3] = Pr [badm.4], as in the proof of Lemma 4.
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